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Abstract 
Network externalities are commonly observed in 
many markets in e-commerce, especially in the 
software market. Many software firms provide 
free-version products to attract consumers. In this 
paper, we build a discrete-time dynamical system 
to investigate why software providers choose to 
offer commercial versions of products as well as 
free versions when network externalities are 
present. We first propose a monopoly model, and 
then build a duopoly model with two competitors, 
and one of whom doesn’t adopt free-version 
strategy. Simulation results verify that the presence 
of network externalities induces firms to provide 
free-version products.  
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The network externality can be defined as a change 
in the utility that a user derives from consumption 
of a product when the number of other users 
consuming the same product changes. This 
phenomenon was first identified in 
telecommunication network, and then on many 
other products, such as operating systems, 
computer games, typewriter keyboards, and online 
trading platforms in the e-commerce.  
Research on network externalities enjoys a high 
popularity in the past three decades. In the classic 
article by Katz and Shapiro [1], a static model 
based on the maximization of profit function and 
the fulfilled expectations equilibrium was 
developed to analyze markets in which 
consumption externalities are present. Following 
the seminal work of Katz and Shapiro [1], 
subsequent researchers have examined product 
compatibility and standardization [2] [3], pricing 
strategies [4] [5], technology revolutions [6] [7], 
online service adoption [8], etc. However, most of 
the models in the above literatures were developed 
in a static framework without considering dynamic 
aspect. These models gave a lot of insights into 
network externalities, but left aside much empirical 
evidence in which the dynamic aspect is crucial [9]. 
Only a few articles discussed network externalities 
in a dynamic environment [9] [10] [11]. Bensaid 
and Lesne [9] developed a discrete-time model to 
study the optimal dynamic monopoly pricing. 
Lambertini and Orsini [10] reconsidered the role of 
network externalities in a dynamic spatial 
monopoly by applying differential equations.  
In the software market, many firms provide 
different versions at different prices via the Internet. 
And sometimes there are free versions, e.g. the 
Microsoft Corporation began to provide a free 
version of office2010 recently. How is it possible 
that firms are willing to offer free products? What 
theory explains this economic phenomenon? Based 
on two-sided network effects, Geoffrey and van 
Alstyne [4] built a model to illustrate the reasons 
and results of providing free-version products. Jing 
[12] investigated how network externalities affect 
the product line decision of a firm. In this paper, 
we build a discrete-time dynamical system to 
investigate the effects of the free-version product 
on a market where network externalities exist. This 
problem is discussed first in the monopoly, then in 
the duopoly setting where two firms adopt different 
strategies.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
section 2, a monopoly dynamical system is 
described. By analyzing the fixed point of the 
system, we find out three different market 
evolution patterns. The effects of parameter 
variation on the market evolution process are 
identified from the simulation results. Section 3 
extends the model to a competitive environment, 
and analyzes the advantages of offering 
free-version product by simulation. Section 4 
summarizes and concludes this paper.  
 
2. Monopoly model and analysis 
2.1 Dynamic model  
Consider a monopoly market over multiple 
discrete-time periods (t=0, 1, 2…) where the 
monopolist supplies two versions of products. One 
version is for free, while the price of the other with 
more functions is p  as a commercial product. 
The value of the products consists of two parts: 
intrinsic value and network value. Intrinsic value is 
the utility a user obtains from the product’s 
inherent features, and network value depends on its 
network size. Let 1u  denote the intrinsic value of 
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the free version, and 2u  the intrinsic value of the 
commercial version ( 12 uu > ). Similar to the 
equations in [12], the product with intrinsic value 
u  can obtain a network value of Qkue )( + , 
where 0, ≥ke , and Q  is the number of 
consumers of both versions.  
Now we turn to the demand side. Each consumer 
demands at most one unit of product. Assume that 
the total consumer population is 1. The utility 
consumers obtained from two versions of products 
can be denoted respectively by 
1 1 1
2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ),
( ) ( ) ( ) .
u
u
T t u e ku Q t
T t u e ku Q t p
= + +
 = + + −
  (1) 
In this dynamic system, there are three states for 
the consumers: },,{ 210 sss . Consumers in the 
state 0s  use neither of the two versions, while 
consumers in the state 1s  use the free version, and 
those in the state 2s  have bought the commercial 
version. In each time period, consumers will decide 
whether to change their states or not. This process 
can be illustrated by Fig.1.  
 
         Fig.1 States transfer paths 
...),2,1,1)(0)(( =≤≤ ttrtr ijij  is the rate of 
consumers transferring from state i to state j in time 
period t. In this paper, we only consider software 
products, and the state transfer paths of consumers 
can only be 0s  to 1s , 0s  to 2s , or 1s  to 2s . 
This process is irreversible. If we denote the 
quantity of free-version users and 
commercial-version consumers in time period t by 
)(),( tytx  respectively, then 
).()()( tytxtQ +=           (2) 













For simplicity, assume that the transfer rate )(trij  
is proportional positively to the utility difference 
between state i and j: 
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Here ( )ijr t  belongs to the interval [0, 1], so Eq.(7) 
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2.2 Equilibria and market evolution 
We first consider the equilibria of system (3), and 
then discuss the market evolution patterns for 
different parameter values. The fixed points of the 
map (3) can be obtained by setting 
)()1( txtx =+  and )()1( tyty =+ , that is 
0)())()(1( 1201 =−−− rtxrtytx ,   (8) 
0)())()(1( 1202 =+−− rtxrtytx .   (9) 
0)(1 >tTu , thus 0)(01 >tr . Hence, there exist 
three equilibra in the market evolution as follows. 
(1) If 0)(,0)( 1202 >> trtr . 
From Eq.(9), we can obtain 
( ) 0,
1 ( ) ( ) 0 .
x t


















(2) If 0)(,0)( 1202 == trtr . 
)()()( tytxtQ +=  increases with time t , thus 
2uT  and 12 uu TT −  increase with time t , so 





consumers ( 0s ) 
)(02 tr  
Free-version 
users ( 1s ) 
Commercial-version 
consumers ( 2s ) 
)(01 tr  
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0)(,0)( 1202 == trtr ,  
then  
0)( =ty .  
Subsequently, we can obtain  
1)( =tx . 














(3) If 0)(,0)( 1202 => trtr . 



















           (10) 
Three equilibria are totally different from each 
other, and the market evolution processes are also 
different. Figs.2-4 show different market evolution 
patterns under the above three conditions. 
Pattern 1 in Fig.2 is the most ideal pattern to the 
firm. The quantity of free-version users increases at 
first, then more and more users of the free version 
purchase the commercial version with the 
increasing of commercial version’s total utility. 
Therefore, )(tx  decreases to zero. Pattern 2 in 
Fig.3 is the worst pattern as no one will purchase 
the commercial version, that’s because its total 
utility isn’t big enough. In pattern 3, there are 
consumers who will purchase the commercial 
version, but no consumers will transfer from 
free-version user to commercial-version consumer 
as 0)(12 =tr  during all periods.  
 
Fig.2 Market evolution pattern 1 
( 8.0,1,2.0,1,1,2.0 21 ====== puuekα ) 
 
Fig.3 Market evolution pattern 2 
( 2.3,1,2.0,1,1,2.0 21 ====== puuekα ) 
 
Fig.4 Market evolution pattern 3 
( 8.1,1,2.0,1,1,2.0 21 ====== puuekα ) 
 
2.3 Numerical simulations 
In the following, we present some numerical 
simulations to show the effects of parameter 
variations on the market evolution process. We 
present two main cases. In the first one, the price of 
the commercial version is variable while the rest 
parameters are all constant. In the second one, the 
intrinsic value of the free version is the only 
variable.  
The variation of p  will impact the market 
structure and evolution. In order to investigate the 
effects, it’s convenient to take the parameter values 
as follows: 1,2.0,1,1,2.0 21 ===== uuekα . 
From the analysis of section 2.2 and Eqs.(4), (5) 
and (6), it’s easy to draw the conclusion that: 
(1) If (0,1.6)p∈ , market evolution pattern will 
be the ideal one with all the consumers buying the 
commercial version finally (similar to the curves in 
Fig.2).  
(2) If 3≥p , market evolution pattern will be the 
worst one with no consumers buying the 
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commercial version (similar to the curves in Fig.4).  
(3) If [1.6, 3)p∈ , market evolution pattern will 
be the second one in which no free-version user 
will buy the commercial version, as the total utility 
of the commercial version isn’t bigger than that of 
the free version.  
Fig.5 and Fig.6 illustrate market evolution curves 
for {0.5,1,1.5, 2, 2.5}p∈ . The maximum value of 
free-version users increases with p , while the 
growth speed of the commercial-version consumers 
decreases with it.  
 
Fig.5 Market evolution curves of )(tx  
 
Fig.6 Market evolution curves of )(ty  
Similarly, we run a simulation based on the 
variation of parameter 1u , other parameters are set 
as: 1,8.0,1,1,2.0 2 ===== upekα . Fig.7, 
Fig.8, and Fig.9 illustrate market evolution curves 
for 1 {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}u ∈ .  
Fig.9 shows that the growth speed of the number of 
commercial-version consumers increases with the 
intrinsic value of the free version at the beginning. 
That’s due to that the population of free-version 
users is bigger when the intrinsic value is higher, so 
the network value of the commercial version 
enlarges, thus the growth speed is faster in the 
initial periods. However, as time period proceeds, 
higher intrinsic value of the free version will lead 
to a lower transfer rate from free version to 
commercial version, as in Fig.8, and we find that 
)(ty  decreases with 1u  during the interim 
periods.  
 
Fig. 7 Market evolution curves of )(tx  
 
Fig. 8 Market evolution curves of )(ty  
 
Fig. 9 Market evolution curves of )(ty  
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3. Duopoly model and simulations 
3.1 Duopoly model  
In this section, we consider a duopoly setting with 
a competitor who only provides one version of its 
product at the price of 'p . And its intrinsic value 
is 'u . In order to describe the system clearly, we 
represent the free-version product of the first firm 
with 'A , the commercial version with A , and the 
product of the second firm with B . As a 
competitor is taken into consideration, a fourth 
state of the system appears. We denote the new 
state which represents product B ’s consumers by 
3s . Fig.10 is the state transfer paths in competitive 
environment.  
 
Fig.10 States transfer paths 
03 3 3( ) (0 1)u ur t T Tα α= ≤ ≤  is the rate of 
consumers who purchase product B  in time 
period t. The user quantity of product B  in time 
period t is denoted by )(tz . For simplicity, 
network externalities between products offered by 
different firms are not considered in this paper. 
Therefore, the utility consumers obtained from 
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               ( ) ,
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x t x t x t y t z t r
x t r
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z t z t x t y t z t r
+ = + − − −
 − + = + − − −
 +
+ = + − − −
 (12) 
   
3.2 Numerical simulations  
The main purpose of this section is to analyze the 
advantages of offering free-version product by 
simulation. Fig.11 shows the market evolution 
process with parameters are set as follows: 0.2,α =  
1 21, 1, ' 0.9, 0.2, ' 1.k e p p u u u= = = = = = =
Assume that ','),()( 2 ppuutzty ===  and 
0)( >tx  in time period t，then )()( 32 tTtT uu > , 
thus )()( 0302 trtr > , so )()1( tyty >+ , which 
means that the existence of the free-version product 
'A  can promote the growth speed of the 
commercial-version product A .  
From the analysis above and Fig.11, we can 
conclude that under the conditions of 'pp =  and 
'2 uu = , the growth speed of )(ty  is faster than 
that of )(tz , and the final market share of product 
A  is bigger than that of product B .  
 
Fig.11 Market evolution processes 
Finally, we run a simulation based on the variations 
of parameter p and 2u . Fig.12 shows the 
simulation results for {0.6, 0.8,1.0,1.2}p∈ , 
with ,8.0',1,1,2.0 ==== pekα 2.0,1' 12 === uuu . 
Fig.13 shows the results of simulation for 
2 {0.7, 0.8 0.9, 1.0}u ∈ ， , and other parameters are 
2.0,1',8.0',1,1,2.0 1 ======= uuppekα . 
We can observe from Fig.12 and Fig.13 that the 
final market share of product A  decreases with 
its price, and if the final market share of product 
A  equals that of product B , the price of A  
will be higher than that of B . And the final 
market share of product A  increases with the 
intrinsic value of it. Similarly, if the final market 
share of product A  equals that of product B , 
the intrinsic value of A  will be lower than that of 
B . Therefore, the presence of network 
externalities induces the firm to provide 
free-version product.  
Consumers of 
product A ( 2s ) 
Potential 
consumers ( 0s )  
)(03 tr  




product B ( 3s ) 
)(02 tr  
)(12 tr  
158
Haiyang Feng, Minqiang Li 
 
The 10th International Conference on Electronic Business, Shanghai, December 1 - December 4, 2010 
 
(a) p =0.6 
 
(b) p =0.8 
 
(c) p  =1.0 
 
(d) p =1.2 
Fig.12 Market evolution processes 
 
(a) 2u =1 
 
(b) 2u =0.9 
 
(c) 2u  =0.8 
 
(d) 2u =0.7 
Fig.13 Market evolution processes 
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From the simulations above, when the price of the 
commercial version is not too high and the intrinsic 
value of it is not too low, the market share of the 
commercial version from the first company is bigger 
than that of the product offered by the competitor who 
doesn’t adopt free-version strategy, and the 
profitability of the first firm is also much stronger. 
That’s because the commercial version benefits from 
the network externalities engendered by the free 
version. However, if the price of the commercial 
version is too high or the intrinsic value of it is too low, 
a lot of users will continue to use the free version.  
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we proposed and analyzed a discrete-time 
dynamical system to investigate the effects of the 
network externalities generated by free-version product. 
We first built a monopoly model with no competition. 
Through fixed points analysis and simulations, we 
found out three market evolution patterns. The impacts 
of the parameter variations on market structure and 
evolution were simulated in experiments .After that, 
the model was extended to a competitive environment. 
Simulation results show that, the firm who adopt 
free-version strategy will get a higher market growth 
speed and a bigger market share, because its 
commercial-version product can gain a larger network 
value through the free-version product. Furthermore, 
the firm who adopt free-version strategy may still 
obtain bigger market share and more profits even 
though the price of its commercial-version product is 
higher and its the intrinsic value is lower. Therefore, it 
is almost always profitable for software providers to 
offer free-version products in the market with network 
externalities. Future research will focus on the optimal 
pricing strategy of multi-version products in the 
monopoly and duopoly in the e-commerce.  
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